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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAEThis Amicus Curiae Brief is respectfully filed by the undersigned members of the UnitedStates Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (“Committee”).1  Actingin our capacity on behalf of the United States government, we may file this Briefpursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a).The Committee exercises oversight responsibility for both the Federal TradeCommission (“FTC”) and the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). With the respect owed to a co-equal branch of government, we file this Brief toshare with the Court our strongly-held views regarding the constitutional lawissues in contest in this appeal and the vital public policy interests served by thenational Do-Not-Call Registry.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTThis appeal requires this Court to reconcile two powerful American values: the right to privacy and freedom of speech.  Telemarketers who make phonesolicitations are engaged in commercial speech protected under the FirstAmendment.  However, when a telemarketer telephones a consumer’s home thatphone call may also be an unwelcome invasion of privacy.  And, by long traditionwithin our society, the right to privacy is at its apex within the home.While telemarketing is commercial speech, this is not at core an ordinarycommercial speech case.  Contrary to first impression, this appeal does not in factturn on whether the Do-Not-Call Registry is a permissible regulation ofcommercial speech under a straight-forward application of the governingcommercial speech standard set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  If the ordinary standards ofCentral Hudson were all that mattered here, the case would be simple given thatthere is no question that the Do-Not-Call Registry is a reasonably-crafted reformthat directly and materially advances a powerful societal interest in the protectionof peace and privacy within the home. Viewed as a case pitting privacy againstregulation of commercial speech, the outcome under existing legal doctrine isclear:  privacy wins.This outcome is dictated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowan v.United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), an early case in which
2the Court upheld a statute that allowed an addressee to refuse mail from any senderof “erotically arousing or sexually provocative” advertising material by notifyingthe local postmaster, who then instructed the sender to remove the addressee’sname and address from its mailing list under penalty of law.  Rowan was a decisionsteeped in reverence for the protection of the privacy within the home, and Rowan,standing alone, contains similarities to this case that ought to be enough to carrythe day for Do-Not-Call.The complication in this controversy, and the crux of this appeal, is not theroutine application of Central Hudson, but rather a quite different FirstAmendment question.  Distilled to its essence, that question is whether thedifferential treatment of commercial and non-commercial telemarketing in thecurrent application of the Do-Not-Call Registry is “content-discrimination” of thesort that renders an otherwise constitutional regime an unconstitutional one.  Thisis the only potentially viable attack advanced by the commercial telemarketers, andit is the only argument that might arguably provide a valid basis for the decision ofthe District Court.  The content-discrimination argument in play in this case emanates almostentirely from one Supreme Court decision, Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,507 U.S. 410 (1993).  In Discovery Network the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, enactedan ordinance restricting newsracks on streets and sidewalks to reduce trafficcongestion and aesthetic blight.  But the ordinance was applicable only to roughly3 percent of the racks in the city, those containing commercial magazines andhandbills, while exempting racks holding traditional newspapers.  The SupremeCourt struck down this content-discrimination, as it should have, for there wasabsolutely no relationship between the aesthetic or traffic harms caused by racksand the content of the material inside them.It is our respectful view that the District Court below erred in accepting theclaim that the Discovery Network content-neutrality principle trumped the Rowanprivacy principle, and the normal operation of the Central Hudson test.  TheDistrict Court’s analysis is flawed in three basic ways.  First, there was content discrimination in Rowan itself; the law in Rowanwas limited to sexually explicit advertising material that would normally have beenprotected by the First Amendment.  Yet the Supreme Court in Rowan held that thefree speech protection afforded the material stopped at the mailbox.  The DistrictCourt missed this essential privacy point.  Whereas Discovery Network involvedregulation of speech in the open marketplace, the traditional public forum of streetsand sidewalks, Rowan applied a different value hierarchy in the exclusion ofspeech from the home.   
3Second, in Discovery Network it was the government acting as the directdiscriminator.  The government banned the commercial newsracks, interfering withcommunication between otherwise willing publishers and readers.  In contrast,with respect to Do-Not-Call, the government is not acting to substitute thejudgment of the community for the judgment of the individual consumer.  Instead,the law empowers the private citizen to bar certain speech from penetrating theconfines of the home, but sovereignty over the decision rests with the consumer,not any government official.  This renders Do-Not-Call similar to Rowan, anddifferent from Discovery Network.Third, viewed both quantitatively and qualitatively, the connection betweenthe governmental interests vindicated by Do-Not-Call and the regulatorymechanism employed by the current FTC and FCC regulations is direct, material,and reasonably tailored.  We argue that, as in Rowan, the government has asubstantial interest in protecting consumers from receiving unwantedcorrespondence.  We support the FTC’s position that the cumulative effect ofunwanted telemarketing calls is intrusive and an abuse of the telephone as amedium of communication.  See Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 1996)(noting that “sheer quantity” of calls generated by automatic dialing andannouncing devices increases the invasion of privacy).  Employing the sort of analysis invited by Central Hudson, Do-Not-Call iseasily defensible as a government response to invasion of privacy.  This stands instark contrast to the regulation in Discovery Network, in which there was acomplete “disconnect” between the objectives of the government regulation --reduction of physical and visual clutter-- and the ban on commercial kiosks.
4ARGUMENTI. DO-NOT-CALL VINDICATES A POWERFUL INTEREST INTHE PROTECTION OF THE PRIVACY WITHIN THE HOMEA.  The Powerful Privacy Interests Advanced by Do-Not-CallThe Do-Not-Call Registry poses a conflict between two sacred Americanvalues, both of constitutional dimensions: the right of privacy and freedom ofspeech.  Privacy may be the most important emerging right of this new century. As technologies make it increasingly difficult for Americans to maintain theirprivacy, evolution in administrative, statutory, and constitutional law is necessaryto keep pace, preserving privacy as an essential element of human dignity.  Just aswe make adjustments for inflation in cost-of-living indexes, we may need to thinkof “escalation clauses” in our legal protection for privacy.  As the power toimpinge on privacy increases, legal principles must escalate to meet the challenge,preserving the power of the average person to fight back against unwelcomeintrusions.  See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding thatthe Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches extended tocover electronic eavesdropping, even though the framers of the Constitution couldnot have contemplated such an electronic search, because the Fourth Amendmentwas intended to protect “people, not places.”) 
5           The privacy of the home is at the core of American conceptions of privacy.    This respect for the home was originally conceptualized as a bulwark against theforce of the state and is embodied in the Fourth Amendment and its guarantee ofthe right of the people to be secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects”against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see alsoSilverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“The Fourth Amendment,and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history.  At the very corestands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free fromunreasonable governmental intrusion.”) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.616, 626-30 (1886)); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1065(C.P. 1765)). This tradition of privacy in one’s home has evolved into a broaderconcept in which the home is seen as an essential to one’s autonomy and privacy, aplace of respite from the world.  In the words of Judge Jerome Frank:  “A man canstill control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat thence fromoutsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeyingthe Constitution.  That is still a sizable hunk of liberty--worth protecting fromencroachment.  A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis,some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, someinviolate place which is a man’s castle.”  United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306,
6315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting); see also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.141 (1943) (The Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance that contained ablanket prohibition of all door-to-door solicitations as an unconstitutionalinfringement of the rights of free speech and press, but the Court was clear in itsdefense of the right of the householder to request not to be bothered.  In the wordsof Justice Murphy:  “[F]ew, if any, believe more strongly in the maxim, ‘a man’shome is his castle’, than I.”  Id. at 150).  B. An Overview of the Statutory and Administrative History of       Do-Not-CallDo-Not-Call is not some newfangled concept rushed into regulation on animpulsive political tide.  It is rather a concept that has evolved over time, asCongress and two federal agencies have labored to balance the compelling societalinterest in the protection of the privacy of the home with the free speech interestsof telemarketers. Congress in 1991 passed the Telephone Consumer ProtectionAct, 47 U.S. § 227  (“TCPA”).  The law was enacted “to protect residentialtelephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid telephone solicitations to which theyobject.” Id. § 227(c)(1).  The FCC was directed to promulgate regulations thatrestricted the use of automatic telephone dialing systems. Id. § 227(b)(1).In 1992, the FCC adopted rules pursuant to the TCPA, but stopped short ofcreating a national “Do-Not-Call” list. The FCC instead required telemarketers toadopt company-specific Do-Not-Call lists.  Under this system a consumer who didnot wish to receive telephone solicitations from a particular company could requestthat the telemarketer remove that consumer’s telephone number from thetelemarketer’s list. Three years after the enactment of the TCPA, Congress in 1994enacted a second important piece of legislation, the Telemarketing and ConsumerFraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (“TCFAPA”).  The lawinstructed the FTC to promulgate rules prohibiting deceptive and other abusivetelemarketing acts or practices and to include in such rules a definition of deceptivetelemarketing acts or practices.  Id. § 6102(a) (1) & (2).  The TCFAPA, enforcedby the FTC, did not apply to activities that were outside of the jurisdiction of theFTC, such as certain financial institutions, common carriers, air carriers and
2  The first significant judicial setback to this momentum was a decision onSeptember 23, 2003 by the United States District Court for the Western District ofOklahoma, U.S. Security v. Federal Trade Commission, -- F.Supp.2d –, 2003 WL22003719 (W.D. Okla. 2003).  In U.S. Security the District Court held that the FTC7
nonprofit organizations, or insurance companies.  In 1995, the FTC adopted rulesimplementing this legislation, which did not contain any national Do-Not-CallRegistry.By 2002, both the FTC and FCC appeared to realize that the company-specific approach had failed to provide adequate privacy protections to consumersand each agency issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requesting comment onwhether a national Do-Not-Call registry should be established.  The FTC alsoproposed rules to address the problem of “abandoned calls” resulting from the useof predictive dialing by telemarketersIn January 2003, the FTC promulgated final rules establishing a nationwideDo-Not-Call Registry and specified requirements for the use of “predictivedialers.”  The FTC found that the previous company-specific Do-Not-Call rules,which permitted a consumer to request that his name be removed from acompany’s call list, were insufficient to protect consumers from unwanted calls. The FTC found that telemarketers interfered with consumers’ attempts to be placedon company-specific lists by hanging up on them or ignoring their request.  TheFTC noted that the prior practice placed too much burden on consumers who hadto repeat their Do-Not-Call request with every telemarketer who called, that thecompany-specific list continually exposed consumers to unwanted initial calls,which had significantly increased in numbers since adoption of the original FTCrules, and that consumers had no method to verify that their name had beenremoved from the company’s list. The FTC exempted charitable organizations from the do-not-callrequirements. The FTC made this exception partly in deference to the heightenedFirst Amendment protection afforded to charitable speech.  The FTC also foundthat abusive telemarketing practices of the sort the registry sought to combat weremore likely to be undertaken by commercial telemarketers than those solicitingcharitable and political contributions.  The FCC followed suit, ultimately adoptingrules that paralleled those of the FTC.Congress strongly endorsed this movement in 2003, enacting the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub.L. No. 108- 10, 7 Stat. 577. (“Implementation Act”). The Implementation Act provided, among other things, that the FTC couldpromulgate regulations establishing fees sufficient to implement and enforce theprovisions of its national Do-Not-Call Registry.2
lacked the statutory authority to create its national registry.  Whereas Congress hadclearly given the FCC the green light to adopt a national registry in acting theTCPA, the District Court reasoned, no similar explicit authority existed under theTCFAP granting parallel authority to the FTC.  In reaching this judgment, theDistrict Court was unmoved by the fact that the Implementation Act appeared totacitly endorse the FTC’s national registry, holding that Congress’ appropriationand fee-authorizing legislation was not a “ratification” of the FTC’s actionssufficient to constitute statutory authorization for the registry.  Congress reactedwith extraordinary swiftness to cure the alleged defect relied upon by the DistrictCourt in U.S. Security.   Within days of the decision, Congress passed andPresident Bush signed into law a statute explicitly and unequivocally granting theFTC authority to enforce the Do-Not-Call registry.8
II. THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THESTRAIGHT-FORWARD APPLICATION OF CENTRALHUDSON AND THE PRIVACY PRINCIPLES RECOGNIZEDBY THE SUPREME COURT IN ROWAN , NOT THECONTENT-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES EMANATINGFROM DISCOVERY NETWORKA.  The Case is Not Close Under Central HudsonCommercial telemarketing is a form of “commercial speech.” Contemporary commercial speech doctrine is governed by the four-part test firstarticulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,447 U.S. 557 (1980): At the outset, we must determine whether the expressionis protected by the First Amendment.  For commercialspeech to come within that provision, it at least mustconcern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, weask whether the asserted governmental interest issubstantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, wemust determine whether the regulation directly advancesthe governmental interest asserted, and whether it is notmore extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
9Id. at 563-64. Neither the commercial telemarketers nor the District Court below contestedthe weight of the government interests vindicated by Do-Not-Call.  The protectionof the privacy of the home is plainly a “substantial” governmental interest, and Do-Not-Call, by eliminating between 40 and 60 percent of telemarketing calls, ismanifestly a program that will “directly and materially advance” that interest. Moreover, the final prong of Central Hudson, the requirement that there be a“reasonable fit” between ends and means, is simply a demand of proportionality,not a requirement of a “perfect” or even “best” fit.  See Board of Trustees of theState University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989; United States v.Edge Broadcasting Co, 509 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1993).  Fundamental to theseconcepts is the notion that government may attack difficult problems throughincremental steps.  The First Amendment’s commercial speech jurisprudence doesnot normally require “all or nothing.”  Rather, “[w]ithin the bounds of the generalprotection provided by the Constitution to commercial speech, we allow room forlegislative judgments.” Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 434.  The FirstAmendment simply does not require “that the Government make progress on everyfront before it can make progress on any front.” Id.  Here, as the history of Do-Not-Call demonstrates, the Congress, the FCC,
10
and the FTC have evolved in their collective legislative and administrativejudgments.  The initial attempts to protect privacy through the company-specificDo-Not-Call did not accomplish the desired privacy objective.  When the newoption of a national Do-Not-Call Registry was introduced, Americans responded indroves, with millions of Americans listing over 51 million phone numbers on theRegistry.  While First Amendment cases are not decided by plebiscite, the tidaldimension of this public response does speak with great probity to the strength ofthe governmental interests serviced by Do-Not-Call, and to the degree of pent-uppublic frustration and dissatisfaction with prior attempts to limit the invasions ofprivacy caused by telemarketing.
In short, if the Central Hudson test was the only standard in controversy,Do-Not-Call would be an easy victor.B. The Principles of Rowan Support Do-Not-CallIn Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), theSupreme Court acknowledged and applied the right of privacy within the home,sustaining the right of the consumer to reject unwanted mail.  In Rowan, the Courtupheld a statute that allowed an addressee to refuse mail from any sender of“erotically arousing or sexually provocative” material by notifying the local
11
postmaster, who then instructed the sender to remove the addressee’s name andaddress from its mailing list under penalty of law.  Noting that the purpose of thestatute was to eliminate governmental involvement in any determinationconcerning the content of the materials, allowing the addressee discretion to rejectadvertising for sexually explicit material, the Court sustained the law.  Rowan is acase steeped in reverence for privacy, and enough, on its own terms, to support Do-Not-Call.            C.  The District Court Failed to Reconcile Properly  Rowan                   with  Discovery Network1.  The District Court’s Reliance on Discovery Network was MisplacedOne might think that the combined learning of Central Hudson and Rowanwould be enough to defeat the challenge to Do-Not-Call.  But while the DistrictCourt below acknowledged Rowan, it failed to appreciate the full implications ofthe Rowan decision.  Instead, the turn of the District Court’s analysis appeareddisproportionately influenced by a different Supreme Court case, Cincinnati v.Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).  In Discovery Network, the city ofCincinnati, Ohio, enacted an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of commercialhandbills on public property.  The ordinance effectively granted distributors oftraditional “newspapers,” such as the Cincinnati Post, USA Today, or The WallStreet Journal, access to public sidewalks through newsracks, while denying
12
equivalent newsrack access to the distributors of commercial magazines andhandbills, such as publications for apartment or house rentals or sales.  Theordinance was designed to reduce the visual and spatial clutter of newsracks.  Theconstitutional difficulty, however, was that no principled distinction could bedrawn between the clutter caused by a USA Today newsrack and one caused by areal estate magazine.  Clutter was clutter, and a newsrack was a newsrack, and thecontent of the speech inside the rack bore no relation to the city’s environmental oraesthetic interests.  The “disconnect” in Discovery Network was all the moreegregious because commercial newsracks, which bore the entire brunt of theregulation, constituted only 3 percent of all racks.
2. The District Court Failed to Apply Sufficiently the Current Case to RowanWe assert that the District Court placed undue emphasis on DiscoveryNetwork, and undervalued Rowan.   The District Court portrayed Rowan assomehow different in kind from the Do-Not-Call Registry, depicting Rowan as acontent-neutral program in which the government did not engage in contentdiscrimination.  We argue that this reading of Rowan is flawed given that there wascontent-based regulation in Rowan.  Indeed, if anything, the content discriminationwas more pointed in Rowan than here.  It is also noted that Rowan involved a
13
restriction on advertising limited to one narrow band of speech--the federal statuteat issue applied to advertisements that offered for sale matter, which the addresseein his sole discretion believed to be “erotically arousing or sexually provocative.” Rowan, 390 U.S. at 730, quoting 39 U.S.C. § 4009(a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV).Thus, while the Do-Not-Call registry applies to all commercialtelemarketing, the postal law in Rowan singled out a subset of advertising, dealingwith erotic material.  The District Court’s analysis below failed to come to gripswith this key element of Rowan.  Yet the existence of this content-discrimination inRowan is enormously important, for when one focuses on it, the driving principlesof the decision in Rowan are far more brightly illuminated.  Those principles wereprivacy and consumer choice.  The confluence of those two values powered theengine in Rowan.  Rowan makes sense only in light of the combination of Rowan’sreference for the privacy within the home and the fact that the consumer, not thegovernment, made the ultimate blocking decision. Indeed, any other explanation ofRowan would be incoherent, then and now.Rowan did not involve  “obscene” speech, which of course would have beenentitled to no constitutional protection whatsoever and could have been bannedoutright from the mail.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  Rather, thiswas sexually explicit but not obscene speech, expression that was within the
14
protection of the First Amendment.  Both at the time Rowan was decided andtoday, it would have been plainly unconstitutional for the government to ban by itsown fiat the transport of such sexually explicit (but not obscene) material throughthe mails or the channels of interstate commerce.  See Reno v. American CivilLiberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Thus the only factors that plausibly explainRowan were the fact that the statute was enacted to reinforce the sovereignty ofindividuals to shut off the entry of the advertising into the home, and the fact that itwas the consumer, not the government, who determined that a certain type ofcommercial speech would be disallowed to enter the consumer’s home.  
3. The District Court Failed to Reconcile Properly Rowan and DiscoveryNetworkIf the District Court below gave insufficient weight to Rowan, it gave toomuch weight to Discovery Network.  The principle of Discovery Network is logicaland important as far as it goes.  But it only goes so far.First and foremost, the District Court below failed to appreciate the keydistinction between Discovery Network and Do-Not-Call for purposes of FirstAmendment values.  In Discovery Network, the government did the censoring bybanning commercial handbill newsracks.  The government directly intervened in
15
the marketplace of ideas, frustrating an otherwise willing publisher from reachingan otherwise willing reader.  And this intervention by the government took place inthe open spaces of city streets and sidewalks, a quintessential public forumtraditionally open to the free flow of public discourse, commercial and non-commercial alike.  Under the Do-Not-Call regime, however, no consumer willingto receive a message is prevented from receiving one, and no messages are blockedby anyone in the open arenas of public discourse and commercial marketing. Theonly decision maker who can block a message is the consumer, and the consumermay block the message only at the threshold of the home.  These distinctionsvacuum the oxygen from the First Amendment claim in this case.  The central FirstAmendment antipathy toward content-discrimination by government, an antipathythat has always been driven primarily by a fear that government will censormessages that it finds offensive or disagreeable, simply is not implicated.  Once again, a comparison to Rowan is pivotal.  For the District Court’sanalysis to be persuasive, it must treat Rowan as essentially overruled by DiscoveryNetwork.  If under Discovery Network distinctions between commercial and non-commercial speech are not permissible, let alone distinctions within the universe ofcommercial speech such as those in Rowan, then the statute in Rowan wouldnecessarily be unconstitutional were that case to come before the Supreme Court in
16
a post-Discovery Network world.  Not only is there nothing in Discovery Networkto indicate that anything so radical was intended, but as previously explained, evenwithout Discovery Network the discrimination that existed in Rowan would havebeen plainly unconstitutional if it had been a government official (such as thePostmaster General) who had been empowered to block the mail to consumers. Rowan, however, established the hierarchy of constitutional trumps.  Privacy andconsumer choice trump freedom of speech when it is the consumer and not thegovernment controlling what speech enters the home and what speech does not.          4.  There is No Paternalism in Do-Not-CallTellingly, this is not a case involving paternalism.  There is no mistaking thearc of modern commercial speech jurisprudence:  in decision after decision theSupreme Court has advanced protection for advertising, repeatedly striking downregulations grounded in paternalistic motivations.   See, e.g., Thompson v. WesternStates Medical Center, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 1505 (2002) (striking down restrictions onpharmaceutical advertising); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554-555 (2001) (striking down some and sustaining some restrictions on tobaccoadvertising); Greater New Orleans Inc., v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999)(striking down casino gambling advertising limitations); 44 Liquormart, Inc., v.Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down liquor advertisement
17
restrictions); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company, 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (strikingdown beer advertising regulations);  Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Business andProfessional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 147 (1994) (striking down restrictions onaccountancy advertising); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (striking downcommercial speech limitations on accountants); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (striking down restrictions on newsracks for commercialflyers and publications); Peel v. Attorney Registration and DisciplinaryCommission of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91(1990) (regulation banning lawyeradvertisement of certification by the National Board of Trial Advocacy asmisleading unconstitutional); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988)(regulation banning solicitation for legal business mailed on a personalized ortargeted basis to prevent potential clients from feeling undue duress to hire theattorney unconstitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of theSupreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down some and upholdingsome restrictions on lawyer advertising); Bolger  v. Youngs Drug Product Corp.,463 U.S. 60 (1983) (statute banning unsolicited mailings advertising contraceptivesto aid parental authority over teaching their children about birth controlunconstitutional); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (regulations limiting theprecise names of practice areas lawyers can use in ads and identifying the
18
jurisdictions lawyer is licensed in as misleadingly unconstitutional); CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)(striking down restrictions on advertising statements by public utilities); In rePrimus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (striking down restrictions on solicitation of legalbusiness on behalf of ACLU); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)(regulation banning lawyer advertisement of prices for routine legal services asmisleadingly unconstitutional).In all of these cases, however, it was the government acting as censor, thegovernment substituting its judgment for that of the consumer.  This is the kind ofover-regulation of the free marketplace that acts as a drag on the economy, and thekind of over-regulation of the marketplace of ideas that acts as a drag on the freeflow of commercial information protected by the First Amendment.Do-Not-Call does not fit this picture.  Do-Not-Call does not place thegovernment in the censor seat.  Do-Not-Call is not about paternalism, but privacy,and that difference changes the constitutional calculus.   See Watchtower Bible &Tract Society of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 164-65 (2002)(observing that the protection of  “residents’ privacy” was among the “importantinterests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation ofsolicitation activity”).  Do-Not-Call is not a paternalistic usurping of consumer
19
choice, it is an empowerment of consumer choice, in aid of the tranquility of thehome.  See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (“The State’s interest inprotecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of thehighest order in a free and civilized society.”).  Just as the traditional law oftrespass empowers the home dweller to bar an unwanted physical visitor, Do-Not-Call empowers the home dweller to bar an unwanted electronic visitor.  As theSupreme Court noted in Rowan, the law has long recognized “the right of ahouseholder to bar, by order or notice, solicitors, hawkers, and peddlers from hisproperty.”  Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737.  “The ancient concept that ‘a man’s home ishis castle’ into which ‘not even the king may enter’ has lost none of its vitality.” Id. With Do-Not-Call, government is not paternalistically skewing themarketplace of ideas.  With Do-Not-Call, consumers are sovereign.  With Do-Not-Call, the Government is reinforcing the ancient shelter the law has provided forprivacy within the home, vindicating the ancient wisdom that the home is one’scastle. C.  The “Fit” Between Ends and Means is Reasonable in Do-Not-Call There are other features distinguishing Discovery Network from Do-Not-Call.  Viewed both quantitatively and qualitatively, the justification for the
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distinctions drawn in Discovery Network were far weaker than the justifications forthe distinctions drawn in Do-Not-Call.  In the traditional parlance of CentralHudson and commercial speech doctrine, the “fit” between ends and means, almostnon-existent in Discovery Network, is plainly “reasonable” for Do-Not-Call.In Discovery Network, there was absolutely no relationship between thecontent of the material inside the commercial handbills newsrack and the capacityof the newsrack to pose a traffic impediment or contribute to aesthetic clutter.  Thephysical characteristics of the newsrack were the source of 100 percent of theperceived harm.  The content of the message inside the newsracks had zeroconnection to that harm.  Moreover, commercial handbill newsracks were the leastsignificant offenders, constituting the smallest percentage of racks, yet bearing theentire brunt of the regulation.  These newsracks constituted only three percent ofthe offending physical objects, but bore 100 percent of the regulatory burden.In the case of telemarketing phone calls, however, the matter is much morecomplex.  The identity of a caller and the content of the phone call do matter topeople.  Not all phone calls are created equal.  Some are more vexatious, irritating,and invasive than others.  Congress, the FTC, and the FCC are entitled to attackthese problems with a dose of realism.  See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515U.S. 618, 628 (1995).  The District Court seemed to think that it was simply the
21
ring of the phone and the hassle of getting up from the dinner table to contend witha call that was at stake.  Respectfully, however, Congress and the enforcingagencies could quite justifiably conclude that for most Americans, volume was alsoa factor.  Volume alone can alter the nature and order of the privacy invasion.  SeeBland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d at 732. Moreover, the District Court gaveinsufficient attention to the critical fact that political and charitable callers do nothave a “free pass” under the existing regime.  However, consumers may also barthese types of telemarketers under the system of caller-specific blocking.  As thisCourt itself noted in its decision granting a stay of the District Court’s order: 
Before the FTC amended its Telemarketing Sales Rule, certain charitable organizations asked the agency not to include non-commercial callers in any do-not-call list (neither anational do-not-call list nor a company-specific do-not-call list). Although the FTC decided not to include charitable callers in anational do-not-call list, it was unwilling to exclude them fromits company-specific do-not-call list if particular homeowners wanted to designate them specifically.  In this context, the FTCstated that charitable callers, in addition to commercial callers, had an effect on homeowners’ privacy, and thus should not becompletely immune from a consumer-initiated restriction.  The FTC stated that “the encroachment upon consumers’ privacy rights by unwanted solicitation calls is not exclusive tocommercial telemarketers” and it therefore concluded thatsome regulation was appropriate even in the non-commercialcontext.  68 Fed. Reg. 4637.  However, the FTC never 
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found that commercial and non-commercial callers affected homeowners’ privacy interests to the same degree.Rather, it emphasized “fundamental differences” between commercial and charitable solicitation that make commercial callers more likely to “engage in all the things that telemarketers are hated for.”  Id.  Because of this distinction, the FTC found it appropriate to subject commercial telemarketers to the national do-not-call registry, but to regulate charitable callers only under the less burdensome company-specific do-not-call rules.  
Federal Trade Commission v. Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc., -- F.3d --(10th Cir. 2003) (Order of October 7, 2003 staying preliminary injunction of theDistrict Court).Thus, in the case of Do-Not-Call, commercial telemarketers comprise themajority of telephone solicitations, and unlike Discovery Network, do not inactuality bear the entire brunt of the regulation.  Political and charitable callers maybe excluded, but such callers are excluded on a more caller-specific basis.  In thecalculus of Central Hudson, in short, the “fit” between the regulatory mechanismand the governmental interest is much stronger for Do-Not-Call, and the extreme“disconnect” in quantitative terms that existed in Discovery Network does not exist. In our view, it is the disruption caused by a bevy of multiple calls duringquality family time that matters to most consumers.  And in a world in whichcommercial telemarketers are by percentage the worst offenders, Congress and the
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two federal agencies could sensibly conclude that empowering consumers to blockall commercial telemarketers with one swoop, and to selectively block otherspecific telemarketers as needed, would be the optimal adjustment of thecompeting interests. See Missouri v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 655-56 (8thCir. 2003) (ruling, in the context of faxes, that a bar on unsolicited commercialfaxes in the TCPA was a reasonable fit with the substantial governmental interestof reducing costs and intrusion, because commercial faxes could be properlyclassified as more intrusive than non-commercial faxes).The “targeting blocking” aspects of Do-Not-Call dovetail well with the factthat it is the consumer, not the government, making the ultimate choice.   Thisconsumer empowerment is a favored device, not a disfavored one, in terms of FirstAmendment values.   See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (observing that a system of consumer-initiated blocking is“less restrictive than banning, and the Government cannot ban speech if targetedblocking is a feasible and effective means of furthering its compelling interests”). Once again, the analysis loops back to Rowan. As this Court noted in its ordergranting a stay of the District Court’s decision, Rowan heavily emphasized theelement of individual choice, and the “opt-in” feature of the mail blocking system,a feature analytically identical to the opt-in feature of Do-Not-Call. Federal Trade
24
Commission v. Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc., -- F.3d -- (10th Cir. 2003)(Order of October 7, 2003 staying preliminary injunction of the District Court)(citing Rowan, 397 U.S. at 730).  The Supreme Court thus strongly endorsed thefact that the home dweller was the “exclusive and final judge of what will cross histhreshold.”  Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736. See also Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying commercial speech standards, the court heldthat in assessing what is or is not a “reasonable fit,” a resident-activated solicitationrestriction was narrowly tailored and of the kind “endorsed by the Supreme Courtin Rowan”); Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 404 (7th Cir. 1998) (striking down aregulation under the “reasonable fit” prong as paternalistic, because, unlike Rowan,“[h]ere, the state, not the homeowner, has made the distinction between real estatesolicitations and other solicitations without a logical privacy-based reason”). 
CONCLUSIONPrivacy and freedom of speech are often in tension in American society. When these values are both implicated in a legal regulation, the constitutionalprinciples protecting the free flow of information must at times be tempered tovindicate privacy interests that are also of ancient vintage and vital importance. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring.)  We
25
assert that in its analysis the District Court placed too much emphasis on theconcepts of content-neutrality, and failed to afford sufficient emphasis on theprotection of privacy.  We respectfully urge this Court to reverse the judgment ofthe District Court, restoring Do-Not-Call, and its critical role in the protection ofprivacy in modern American life.
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